The Employer Free Choice Act has had enjoyed strong academic support. but thus far has been stymied by fierce political resistance to its central positions that first institute a card-check for the selection of a union and then requires mandatory arbitration if the parties cannot agree to a new contract within 130 days of union recognition. This articles critiques the arguments made in support of this fundamental revision of labor law offered by
American business and accepted much of the populist critique that attributed the great financial crisis in the fall of 2008 to corporate greed and financial machinations. Relationships between the administration and organized labor were close, and the two showed every sign of working effectively together on a powerful Congressional campaign to turn the bill into law. Unlike the pending health care legislation that eventually did become law after some titanic struggles, 1 EFCA is a short bill whose implementation does not require levying any new taxes or creating of any major new administrative agency. Intellectually and emotionally, EFCA fed off the widespread and determined perception within pro-labor circles, both in practice and the academy who were (and are) convinced that the feeble union remedies under the National Labor Relations Act-usually holding new elections or issuing bargaining orders-leave employers who consciously breach the statute better off than they would have been if they had complied with the law. That figure is down from a high of about 35 percent in 1954. Indeed so great is the transformation in union membership that today there are more members of public unions than in private unions, by a respectable margin of 7.9 million to 7.4 million workers. 3 Nonetheless, as this is written in the summer of 2010, EFCA seems dead in the water, with no likely prospect of its revival in the short run. In the first two years of the Obama presidency, the enthusiasm of labor for the bill was matched every step of the way by the undying hostility of employer groups toward the legislation. 1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), News Release, Union Members 2009, January 20, 2010, found at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf: "More public sector employees (7.9 million) belonged to a union than did private sector employees (7.4 million), despite there being 5 times more wage and salary workers in the private sector." P. 1. 3 Id. "More public sector employees (7.9 million) belonged to a union than did private sector employees (7.4 million), despite there being 5 times more wage and salary workers in the private sector." P. 1.
These groups acted with a singleness of purpose that is not normally found in the fractious ranks of American industry, where businesses are often at loggerheads with each other. One sign of that unit is that these organizations funded my own book The Case Against the Employee Free Choice Act. 4 (They have had absolutely nothing to do with this article.) To be sure, not all firms were equally opposed to EFCA. Those businesses that were already unionized could obtain some compensatory advantage if their rivals were subject to similar (or even more burdensome) union contracts. But even that small advantage was not in general enough to swing any employer into the pro-EFCA camp, for EFCA also held out the distinct possibility of further unionization of firms in which unions had already acquired a foothold. It is no deep secret that employers do not welcome unions within their gates. Whether these employers could have succeeded against a fullcourt administration press remains unclear. But the employers were surely aided by the decision of the Obama administration to subordinate labor law reform to health care legislation, financial legislation (which still hangs in the balance, and climate control legislation (which is going no where soon).
The full explanation for the stalemate over EFCA does not rest, however, solely in the relative strength of management and labor in this struggle. All partisan disputes take place in arenas where neutral third parties can choose up sides. On this particular occasion, the unions faced intense public antipathy to the most conspicuous portion of EFCA, which allowed unions to gain representation by a card check, without going through a secret ballot elections. The obvious risks of fraud and coercion in such a procedure brought out such individuals as George McGovern, the Democratic Presidential nominee in 1972, against the bill. 5 I regard these 4 Richard A. Epstein, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT (Hoover Press 2009). I also wrote several independent pieces toward the same end. See, e.g., Richard developments as both welcome and long overdue. EFCA represents a potential catastrophic federal intervention in labor markets, which is far worse than the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, which, to urge the unthinkable, should be repealed in favor of a return to the common law system of labor relations that prevailed prior to the New Deal. 6 Needless to say that this opinion is not shared widely by the academics who specialize in labor relations, and who in general are highly supportive of the current law and, in most but not all instances, in favor of all or some of EFCA's major innovations. The purpose of this article is to review and comment the recent arguments that pro-labor scholars have advanced for EFCA as a way to make up for the remedial shortfalls of the NLRA. Make no mistake about it, the adoption of EFCA would in fact be a more dramatic development than a return to the 1935 Wagner Act 1935, 7 by the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. 8 Front and center are the questions of how to allow guarantee unions to things: the right to organize, and the ability to win first contracts. These are the only way to stem the rapid decline in unionization that takes place through the unrelenting attrition of large unions in old-line industries. It is no surprise therefore that EFCA has nothing to say other key issues associated with labor relations, such as the operation of the grievance process, of the use of the strike and the lockout as economic weapons in labor disputes..
In the end, their effort to transform established law has proved a bridge too far. The Democratic and union effort to transform American labor law by brute political force failed, in the face of the widespread public uneasiness with the bill.
But however dormant EFCA is politically, it continues to garner major support inside the labor union and among its many academic backers. It is therefore 6 important to give close attention to the arguments for a bill that could be reintroduced at any time, be it as freestanding legislation or as a rider to some other bill. The purpose of this paper is to examine and refute the case that is made for the legislation. On this issue, there is no middle ground: EFCA should never be enacted into law.
EFCA itself consists of three separate provisions. The first two, which are best considered together have as their object the exclusion or reduction of employer influence in the union organization process. The first departure for current law modifies the rules governing employer unfair labor practices (ULPs) during organization campaigns, which in effect is describing as "Strengthened Enforcement." 9 This section increases the penalties for unfair labor practices imposed against employers during an organization drive without touching the penalties for unfair labor practices by labor unions. The second provision, which EFCA goes by the soothing name of "Streamlining Union Certification, allows, at the option of "either the union or any group of employees," 10 the routine substitution of the card-check for the NLRB supervised secret election that now represents the preferred approach under the Act That card check procedure effectively allows for unions to undertake organization campaigns in relative secrecy, and thus neutralizes, without prohibiting, much of the employer's voice in an organization campaign. These first two elements are considered together because each is meant to reinforce the other. The third major reform, described as facilitating initial collective bargaining agreements, calls for the use of a two-year mandatory "contract" that is determined by an arbitral board selected the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), if the parties fail to come to an agreement after a negotiation process that lasts, all stages included, 130 days. 11 This mandatory arrangement is imposed even when both the union and management have in good faith bargained to impasse under the present NLRA. All three provisions are set out in full in the Appendix. The cumulative effect of these three provisions would lead to 9 EFCA § 4. 10 Id. § 2. 11 Id. § 3, a massive shift in the balance of power between labor and management, and, I fear, to new levels of mutual animosity in an area where political relations between the two sides are already frayed.
The question is how to evaluate these three proposals. In doing so I propose to take the analysis in two steps. In the first step I look at two sets arguments that have been made to strengthen the union position in organizing drives. 18 He goes on to make the further case that this was indeed the right set of legal relationships, on the ground that the internal affairs and operation of the union were of no concern to an employer. And he further notes the close connection between this effort to exclude the employer from worker deliberations during this initial period, by noting that in the early years a union did not have to be chosen solely through a secret ballot election, but could designed via a card check, which had this advantage:
"Membership cards could be solicited without employers knowing that their employees were organizing." 19 His bottom line therefore was that employers should be relegated to the role of distant observers in union elections, without any participation in the basic process, and without any rights of speech associated with the campaign process. In effect, the employer has no seat at the making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with the recognized union and its representatives. The fatal objection to using this homely international example over to the NLRA is that it does not take into account the other major adjustments that the NLRA works on the arrangement between an employer and employee.
It would be perfectly acceptable to follow Becker's striking position in a world in which freedom of association governed every aspect of management/labor relationships. Under that view, it is clear that by parity of reasoning labor groups could exert no influence in the way in which employers chose to govern their businesses or in the policies that they choose to pursue in relationship to labor. In particular, those principles would allow the employer not to deal with any union representatives at all, and to insist that any worker agree that during the term of employment that they do not join any union or promise to join any union so long as they continue to work for the employer. These "yellow dog" contracts in effect would force a firm's workers to be loyal to one side or another. But no worker could in a regime of strong autonomy have his cake and eat it too, by forcing the employer to hire even though a union member or supporter.
A second precondition for the Becker synthesis is that under this basic autonomy model, the union could not bind those workers who decided to stay out of membership. Any accurate rendition of the principle of freedom of association does not allow for majorities in some stated-determined bargaining unit to bind other individuals who are by a combination of administrative decision and majority vote shepherded into their ranks against their will, such that their own prior contracts can be abrogated over their objection once the union obtains a majority of votes within the union. 23 In order to avoid this conclusion, the NLRA, in line with the view of Pound and others, adopts the dubious rhetoric ploy that workers do not have "full" or "actual" freedom of contract so long as they are opposed by firms that consistent of an aggregation of shareholders. 24 24 "The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries." 29 U.S.C. § 151. 25 workers, it can certainly refuse to bargain with a collectivity of workers whose monopoly power has long been regarded with suspicion by the law for its tendency to lower output, raise wages , and reduce overall social welfare.
It is thus misguided for defenders of the NLRA to appeal to the principle of freedom of association given that the statute is intended to create monopoly power, not eliminate it. Indeed, given that position, the antidiscrimination norm should apply against unions to be sure that they do not use their power to discriminate against some workers in favor of others. The most obvious axis of discrimination is of course race, which is why the Supreme Court grafted onto the basic statute a duty of fair representation to protect minority workers from majority exploitation in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. 28 only have to grapple with the implications of that duty in race cases for over a decade to come. 29 It follows therefore that the principle of freedom of association for workers cannot be invoked to defend the NLRA when that statute has irrevocably altered all the background conditions under which that claim of freedom of association becomes defensible. Thus in ordinary cases, any group that decides to organize is subject to the constraints of the antitrust law to the extent that it seeks to dominate one side of the market. Put otherwise, the collective refusal to deal counts as a per se 27 The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conduct for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws." In its terms, Section 20 of the Clayton Act limited the ability of courts to issue injunctions against unions or their members in various labor disputes "unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right."
In United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), the Supreme Court held that Section 20 also barred criminal prosecutions in light of the Norris-LaGuardia Act's intention to boost union organizing efforts. Justice Frankfurter never stopped to ask whether the attack on the labor injunction rested on the institutional risk of allowing a private party to use the labor injunction, which is removed when the action is taken by the government. Frankfurter had insisted that distinction in Felix Frankfurter & Nathaniel Greene, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 220 (1930), written just before the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which noted that the legislation "explicitly applies only to the authority of United States courts 'to issue any restrained order or injunction. '" 35 See Clayton Act, § 6 and § 20.
unionized firms to drive nonunionized firms out of business. 36 That section can only be regarded as ad hoc boon to labor unions, which fundamentally alters the background conditions, under which the claim for strong union autonomy should be examined.
Next, of course, the freedom of association is a principle that requires acceptance by unanimous decision not by majority vote. To be sure, all the workers in a given workplace could give their assent to have their membership in a union their influence felt on company decisions. In a world that lets allows yellow dog contracts, employers have little need to take defensive actions. But once those sensible, procompetitive contracts are made illegal, the employer, fearing the loss of both management prerogatives and overall productivity, is well-advised to choose plant locations, design their plants and other facilities, to structure assembly lines and to contract out in ways that minimize vulnerability to union initiatives. These expenditures are not easily quantifiable because they all involve decisions that mix union with nonunion issues. But no prudent employer would ever broadcast these elements, lest it bring the wrath of reformers, unions and the NLRB down on his shoulders. Employers take this step because they are consequent of the seriousness that the labor threat imposes to the efficiency of the firm, which is some measure of the social losses of unionization. If matters were otherwise, and unions helped firms, the opposition would instantly melt away.
At this juncture, the purpose is not to demand repeal of established labor law. It is only to point out that there has to be some limit to the legal advantages that unions should receive. Indeed, the better reading of the history shows that many of the major adjustments in the Taft-Hartley law were perceived as countervailing responses to the advantages the unions received under the original Wagner Act.
Here are a couple of examples.
Secondary boycotts. Consider the position of the secondary boycott that was legitimated under the Clayton Act. The power of these boycotts are only increased if they can be combined with the direct pressure that unions can place on employers through the collective bargaining process. In the end the one/two combination proved to be too powerful. Once unions had direct remedies against the employer, the pressure of secondary boycotts could prove too great. The Taft-Hartley law thus included an elaborate statutory provision that limited their scope in section 8(b)(4) which sought to control their influence. The boycotts that might be tenable when unions had little power against their primary employer proved much more ominous when those rights were in place. 42 Labor Injunctions. To progressives, the labor injunction against organizing activities was one of the great abuses of the pre-1932 period, which was rectified by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which greatly narrowed its use in all labor disputes by abolishing its use, for example, to enforce yellow dog contracts. But the question arises whether that hostile attitude toward injunctions makes sense in connection with a collective bargaining agreement in which the union agrees to a clause that prohibits "no cessation or stoppage of work, lockout, picketing or boycotts. Becker disapproves of this section because he thinks that it resurrects the false equivalence between employer and employee speech that the original Wagner Act rejected. 49 But look at the question from the other side. How, one might ask, does Section 8(c) meet the normal constitutional standard robust and uninhibited debate generally characteristic of democratic institutions? "Democracy" is the first word in the title of Becker's article. So where is the disconnect between the statute and the theory? Not in its use of the term "force", at least if that is confined to physical force or the threat thereof. The term "reprisal," however, is filled with studied ambiguity because it covers both political opposition and bodily harm, which give rise to widely divergent response at common law. So why can't an employer take reprisals by firing workers who don't want to work on terms that the employer finds acceptable? Because it would gut the Act, pure and simple.
The same is true for the benefit side of this statutory equation. Outside the area of labor law, offering benefits is generally the preferred way to get things done. 47 See, Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617. 48 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). 49 Becker at 544-554, explicitly attacking the dicta in the Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545-48 (1945) .
But in the context of collective bargaining agreements, offering benefits to workers cannot be allowed if the statutory scheme is to survive. Thus suppose that at the outset a union organizational drive the employer offers to match term for term the best union offer, so long as workers did not join the union. That strategy is too potent because no union will ever initiate an organization drive if it knows that the employer has this ironclad counterstrategy. So the survival of collective bargaining process depends on backing off of traditional free speech accounts.
The key question is how far. The gist of the Becker proposal is to take 8(c) one step further. Just keep the employers from speaking at all about the internal affairs of unions as part of the grand statutory recalibration of labor law. Against the backdrop of common law rules, the position is tenable so long as the employer can flat out refuse to deal with organized workers. But now that option is gone, as the duty to bargain gives the workers a real club against the employer. Faced with that reality, why should it be powerless to speak on its own behalf about an institution with whom it is obliged to bargain if the outcome of the election goes against it?
Silence in the face of a duty to bargain has the same effect of a secondary boycott when there is a duty to bargain. It shifts the advantage too far to one side and allow unions to make claims that undecided workers could have little chance to examine.
Right now employers get that message through by describing firms that failed after unionization, only to predict that the same thing will happen here. The message is effective and tends to change minds and votes, which is why it should remain legal, at least if not tainted by an implicit threat. Given the changes in the background rules, the speech rules should stay exactly where they are. In its own way, the current law makes the appropriate adjustments given the initial commitment to collective bargaining.
Sachs and Default Rules. The Sachs article mounts a defense for EFCA on two of its three issues: unfair labor practices during organizational campaigns and the use of the card check. He does not address the compulsory arbitration piece of the puzzle. Sachs does not think that EFCA offers the solution to the current defects, although he would certainly embrace its passage. Instead he seeks to identify certain key "asymmetries" in the bargaining process that give an unfair advantage to employers. As with Becker before him, he accepts as given the soundness of the original commitments of the Wagner Act insofar as it allows a single union to be the exclusive bargaining representative of workers within a given unit. And like Becker, the words "statutory monopoly" never appear in an article that totals 37,915 words.
Rather he denies this market reality by claiming what no one would care to dispute: "Unionization, for better or worse, does not effect a shift in sovereignty over the firm. It is a far more limited process, one in which employees decide to bargain collectively, rather than individually, with their employers and to name their agent for these purposes." 50 This state is only half right. The evocative word "sovereignty" would apply only if the union does not take over the firm lock, stock and barrel. But it is false if it is meant to say that the employer should be indifferent to the arrival of a union. The law does force the employer to the bargaining table, which amounts to a partial takeover over its operations, a partial lien on its assets, and thus a part ownership in the business. Given that level of power it is hard to conclude as he does that this "impact" on employers " does "not entitle employers to an affirmative right to intervene in that [unionization] process." The impact in this case is not just that of a competitor. It is someone with positive claim on firm assets.
In essence, Sachs's claim repeats the Becker error. The union can have explicit claims against employers but should also be immune from any employer counterclaims on workers. As before, the case against the employer's additional speech rights under the NLRA disappear with its duty to bargain with the union. At that point its right to speak about union elections are not zero. They are just the same as any random outsider who wishes to comment on union affairs. None of this matters to Sachs' enterprise, which is premised on the unquestioned soundness of some collective bargaining regime, with this caveat: it must lead to an increase of unionized workers over the current level, by strengthening the hand of unions in their organization drives. Consistent with that objective, Sachs's political objective is to minimize or eliminate the influence that employers can exert over the question of whether workers will be represented by unions. In his view the card check serves 50 Sachs, at 661. that goal admirably because it is designed "to allow workers to complete a unionization effort before management is aware that such an effort is underway." 51 Note that the choice of the word "workers" is consciously disingenuous, for Sachs is well aware that under EFCA any union is allowed to trigger the card-check process without any showing of union support among the rank of employees. He also quotes at length from the organizing manuals of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Organizing and the Teamsters to the effect that secrecy is a premium virtue. 52 The ostensible targets of that secrecy are, moreover, not just the employer, but also those members of the employer's workforce who would likely be opposed to unionization. The system which allows a majority, or even a supermajority, of cards to settle the question of union organization could freeze out these workers from a process that still has some faint aspiration of full participation for all persons within the unit in the deliberative process that leads to unionization in the first in light of the new learning from behavioral economics, which in his view should render us much more sympathetic to for-cause labor contracts at common law and to unionization under the National Labor Relations Act. 53 In addition, he also turns to more recent writing by two Harvard colleagues writing on the fields of statutory interpretation and corporate governance. In speaking of the former, Einer Elhauge argues that in those cases in which there is radical uncertainty as to the meaning of the statute, a court should adopt that interpretation that maximizes the likelihood that it will be corrected by subsequent legislative action. The theory here is that since right and wrong is in this select class of cases, the best one can do is make a decision that invites rectification if the original error was wrong. Let me take these cases up in order. These are rights that the common law confers on the employer, which the employer could then decide to purchase if they were at greater value to him. Yet on that score the endowment effect, whereby people value what they own more than they do not, could easily interfere with the transaction by creating sticky default rules. 56 employer by the common law; any suggestion that the common law reflects "laissezfaire," or promotes "voluntary interactions," should be prefaced with this point." 57 The stark models of rational economic calculators should give way to a more complex model that stresses the imperfections in human intelligence on all matters from the asymmetrical attitude to gains and losses, to ignorance of the legal rules, to excessive optimism, and improper discounting. 58 The criticisms are idle on both analytical and behavioral grounds. On the first point, it is important to note what a default rule does. One simple question: can the default rule be changed by agreement before the initial contract, or only after it is formed in accordance with the stipulated norm. To Sunstein it looks to be the latter.
The initial contract must to create some sort of initial entitlement that only after formation the other party can decide to purchase. It is for that reason that he makes the dangerous suggestion that workers should be given an initial entitlement to a for-cause contract which the employer could then buy away. Conventional default rules do not serve in that function at all. They are gap fillers when parties have incomplete contracts. The default rule could be set, for example, in favor of a forcause contract. But if it is only a default rule, the employer can announce prior to any actual agreement to all prospective employees, either you come on my terms or you do not work at all. There is no duty to make an initial contract on the default. In this conventional sense, the law could set the legal default any way it wants , but so long as the yellow dog contract were allowed, the parties could move in that direction.
No one has to buy any thing from anyone. On matters as critical as this, the for-cause default rule is not sticky. Employers will make it clear to employees in a thousand ways that this is the rule of engagement.
We are, however, dealing with a very different animal if the default rule is a necessary feature of any first contract, which can only be eliminated thereafter by paying for a release from the other side. That appears to be what Sunstein advocates with his disastrous intervention on the contract at will. The initial-contract must be entered into on a for cause basis. Thereafter, the employer could buy out the worker The labor law defaults are only of this hard second variety. It is not possible under the law for any employer to tell his workers that I will only hire you if you agree to sign away all rights to join a union under procedures set out by the NLRA.
The issue here has nothing to do with default provisions. It has everything to do with contractual invalidity of contract provisions that are against public policy. At this point, it is also illegal once the employment relationship is done to attempt to interfere with the statutory machinery by offering each worker $10,000 to avoid the union drive. We can be relatively agnostic about the setting of contract default provisions, so long as we are aware that in virtually every case an explicit provision in bold letters will say that whatever informal promises the contract provides you with, the overall agreement is only a contract at will. But we cannot be indifferent to the choice of default arrangements like those contained in the NLRA, which reshape an industry.
In dealing with these statutory requirements, it is a huge mistake to claim that the defenders of common law rules think that "the common law system of property rights has some natural, preconventional status." 59 No one thinks that. The task of getting a set of individual baselines that will reduce the voluntary transaction costs needed to reach that system that has on average the highest output, which is a competitive market, which as noted drives the antitrust law as well as the common law.
So once we recognize that nature is not the source of the common law baseline, what next? That piercing insight does not exonerate the attackers of the common law rules from the duty to explain why their baseline is superior to the one 59 Sunstein, Human Behavior, 87 VA. L. REV. at 209. that they dislike. They too much give case to a normative baseline from which the pro union position can work. That is a task that they have never attempted to do.
The difficulties are fatal. Start with the cognitive difficulties. Once we know that people are subject to biases and to the ability of assimilate information, the last thing that we need is a unique and convoluted labor law whose many features they cannot understand. Does anyone think that impaired workers are better off deciding on the benefits of having a union that could negotiate a contract that may or may not pay off than just having an offer of a job at a stated salary. The simpler the legal system, and the greater the number of choices, the better the information. To socalled union baseline only makes things worse for imperfect minds.
But, just for the sake of argument, assume that the common law baseline is wrong, and that some unionized alternative should be put in its place. Again the question is, what next? At a minimum that baseline must have the same degree of universality that is found under the common law rules, so that it explains how parties should proceed in each an every employment relationship subsumed under the new rule. The common law rule specifies that the owner has his capital and the worker has his labor. They can exchange these on what ever terms and conditions they see fit. They are not obligated to fit themselves into some predetermined category of employer/employer, but could easily choose to work as partners or as independent contractors. Their intention, as expressed in public language controls.
The rule works to cover everything from the small two-person business to large and complicated corporations. Each set of contracts builds on those that works. The secret of the system is to have clarity in terms (for which intelligent default provisions help) and consistency in enforcement. The hope in all case rests on two fundamental propositions. The first is that the voluntary trade between the parties produces mutual gain. The second is that the greater level of wealth for both parties increases opportunities for third persons. The antitrust laws remain a limitation that sometimes bites against contracts in restraint of trade, which, as in Loewe v.
Lawlor, is a nontrivial binding constraint against unions.
So just what baseline is proposed in its place? I cannot conceive of any profusion default rule that could be made operational, for example, in the context of a new firm that has hired two or a dozen workers. Is not possible for any one to hire a worker unless he first goes to some union? To which one should he turn, and why?
In the event of some jurisdictional dispute, should one union be able insist that it has the right to represent workers to this nascent firm even before it is formed? Do the workers, or prospective workers, have to be polled in advance to see whether they would like to join that union? And must that poll be held multiple times, as new workers are added and current employees leave? It is not necessary to insist that the ordinary contractual regime is natural, God-given or, in some mysterious sense, prepolitical It is enough to show that it is blessed with a versatility and simplicity that no ad hoc prounion baseline could hope to achieve. Sachs does well not to push to pin down the new default position. You can't beat one well-established baseline with a philosophical objection to the possibility of forming some better one. The critique of the status quo has to articulate an alternative baseline that is able to withstand the functional criticism of its common law opponents. No alternative baseline that meets this standard has ever been articulated, let alone implemented.
And none will.
Elhauge and Self Correction. In his treatment of statutory construction, Einer Elhauge thinks less of cognitive biases and more the public choice dynamics that deal with the correction of judicial decisions that could in principle misstate the proper interpretation of a given point of law. Wholly apart from its application to labor law, I think that this theoretical effort to manipulate default terms is tenuous in its own terms. Statutes are often passed as parts of elaborate compromises, which may be construed by courts years after their initial promulgation. The question of finding the easiest path toward legislative correction thus requires the conscientious court to first determine which legislature should set the baseline for this analysis. Does one look the legislature that passed the law, even if it is no longer in office? The one that is now in office, even if an election is drawing nigh? Or some future legislature whose composition is unknown? Should it matter if the prospects for altering interpretation X in one house are better than those of altering interpretation not-X, only for the position to be reversed in the other.
There is, alas, no principled way to answer any of these questions of implementation, even assuming that the second legislature will confine itself to selfcorrection, rather than more legislative adventurism. Even on that simplifying assumption. Courts have to get information about questions, which will generate uncertainty at least as great as that which surrounds the proper interpretation of a disputed provision. Matters become even more difficult because it is quite likely in many settings that no matter what the judicial decision, the losing side would be unable to muster the political forces to reverse the decision. Bare majorities do not cut it in legislative settings. Let the Congress or state legislature be divided 55/45, and nothing will happen if there is a de facto supermajority requirement of 60 percent in order to get the program through. The default test thus comes up empty.
Worse still, Elhauge's general approach runs the serious risk of corrupting the judicial process. There is no reason to create an legal environment where it pays judges to feign a level of uncertainty about a statutory provision in order to apply this dubious methodology. The errors here are two. First, most statutes actually contain information that points, at least weakly to one interpretation or another. A result-oriented judge should find it child's play to magnify the scope of the uncertainty in order to open the path wide to the public choice inquiry that maps well into his or her preferences on the desirable policy outcome. There is no protection against this abuse from either side of any knotty question. The only way to avoid these difficulties is to resort back to the usual combination of text, structure and context to get these things right. It is not my place to talk about these issues here, but it is instructive to note that Sachs at no point gives an instance of how this method could work even in its home domain of statutory construction. And it is equally instructive that no judge has ever overtly adopted this as the mode of interpreting the statute.
Bebchuk, Hamandi, and Corporate Governance. The same point can be said about the theory of Bebchuk and Hamandi to construe governance rules in ways that cut against management, given its superior control over the processes. The initial task is to manufacture the area of textual uncertainty, which is more difficult here than it is with statutes, given the management team that drafts these provisions typically do not have to engage in the kind of last-minute compromises that are an inseparable part of the legislative process. Nor is it clear that all disputes involve management/shareholder conflicts. Thus a dividend issue may pit the preferred shareholders against the common shareholders, or the bondholders against the shareholders, so that the political economy story has little salience. And, as is the case with political calculations made in the guise of statutory interpretation, it hardly makes sense to encourage judges to magnify the scope of uncertain to increase their power to decide as they see fit. The far superior approach is to respect business expectations and intentions in order to give people the confidence that the deals they make will be honored by the courts that enforce them. It is telling that no court to my knowledge has openly avowed the use of these techniques. To do so would be a fatal concession of the illegitimacy of the overall process.
From Interpretation to Institutions. In dealing with all three writers on whom Sachs relies, it is critical to note the vast gulf that separates questions of contract interpretation from questions of institutional design. The default position at stake does not involve the proper default norm for contract, statutory or charter interpretation raised by Sunstein, Elhauge and Bebchuk/Hamadani respectively.
Rather it involves the more ambitious task of creating a set institutions that can be put in place on the ground, which is a far more ambitious matter. There is little It is an open question of how much any change in campaign rules can alter the labor landscape now that there are no huge 1930 style assembly lines left to organize. But it is worth while analyzing these two positions anyhow. The first common device is an expedited election that gives an employer something under two weeks after the campaign is announced to make out its case, instead of the nearly six weeks that is allowed for an election campaign today. The sole reason for speeding up the election is to prevent the influence of employer speech from removing the advantage of surprise that a union has in timing the call for an election. The danger here is not that the employer will say things that violate section 8(c), but that they will be able to point out examples and make arguments that turn out to be persuasive to workers. In effect, the argument in favor of the expedited election is that incomplete information that favors unions is better the full information that does not, which is hard to square with any effort to insured informed worker choice. The argument in effect becomes that all persuasive speech should be regarded as improper threats rather than sound arguments. 64 That claim is inconsistent with the revisions found in Taft-Hartley that give equal weight to the right to remain free of union influence. The card-check is even worse because of its allows the union campaign to proceed by stealth. Once again the point here is to force the issue before the full information is acquired by workers who might turn against the union, which is again inconsistent with any version of a full participation model.
The supposed reason adopting either or both of these strategies to overcome the coordination problem that workers have in getting a union in place against the implacable opposition of the employer. 65 But the actual reasons are more complex than that. 66 The first point is that the union which runs the organizational campaign has no problems of its internal organization. They are not subject to any of the limitations imposed on employer speech under section 8(c), but can promise the 64 Id. at 48-53. 65 See, Sachs at 697: "Employees who wish to unionize therefore bear the coordination costs of identifying and contacting other employees during nonwork time and at nonwork locations." So do antiunion workers, whom management helps at its peril. 66 For a fuller discussion see Epstein, EFCA 22-34. moon with impunity. And just as employers can resort to tactics that might involve unfair labor practices, so unions can resort to all sorts of rough stuff on their side in order to make the position of the employer as painful as possible. They can hire pickets (who are not workers at the plant) to protest working conditions in efforts to drive away customers. They can file complaints, often anonymous with regulators that bring snap inspections against workers. They can make direct political appeals to zoning boards to keep out firms that do no agree to accept union demands. They can isolate individual workers via house calls through intimidation. In these cases, the longish wait to an election is in the union (but not the worker) interest because it allows these pressure techniques to exert a cumulative toll. It is in part for this reason why the union wants the option for the early election, but not the duty to abide by one.
Most ironically, disorganized workers work to the interest of a union in a card check as the disorganized sentiments of the antiunion workers are thereby held in check. Thus a worker whose first preference is to keep out of the union may well sign a card if he or she fears that the union will be selected over his or her opposition. At this point, enough swing votes could put matters back the opposite way. In sum, both parts of the campaign are wrong. The alternative baseline is unworkable, easing the path to organization unsound.
Fisk and Pulver and the Allure of First Contract Arbitration. The task of Fisk and Pulver is to defend the back end of the union agenda, namely, the push to mandatory arbitration. As with the organization phase of the campaign, the key objection to the current status quo is that determined employers just hold out too long against union demands. 67 It is rarely stated that the unions are too reluctant to moderate their demands, even though it always takes two to make an impasse. The source of these drawn-out negotiations, moreover, lies in the NLRA's basic commitment to a collective bargaining regime that leaves an employer no one to negotiate with but the union, which can only bargain with an employer with respect to its employees. 67 Fisk & Pulver, at 56-58.
This bilateral monopoly structure invites holdout and bluff on both sides. The pattern of this bargaining game depends critically on the perceived size of the bargaining range. The union hopes to move the agreement toward a monopoly wage. The employer knows that it cannot go below the competitive wage. In the immediate New Deal period, the want of foreign competition (coupled with various domestic barriers to entry in such key industries as communications) created a large bargaining range. 68 The willingness of unions to go on strike and of employers to lock out made sense when there was a good deal to be gained or loss. But as the removal of entry barriers, both domestic and foreign, made labor markets more competitive, there was less to gain through either strikes or lockouts, so a greater measure of calm returned to labor markets. Prolonged negotiations no longer meant a disruption in production, so employers had much to gain from the status quo ante.
Unions for their part could not succeed if they could not bring wage and benefit packages that mattered, which is a tall order in competitive product markets.
That pattern of decline has not held true for public unions, which face little or no competitive pressures from public employers, who were often under state law commands to bargain under compulsory arbitration regimes. As noted earlier, their ranks have swelled until they exceed in absolute terms the number of union members in the private sector. These regimes usually offer a laundry list of relevant factors that includes a range of information the looks to comparable wage, benefit and conditions data in comparable markets, and asks ominously about "the financial ability of the unit of government to meet these costs." 69 The richer you are, the more we can demand, a form of wage discrimination that is consistent with monopoly power. Not surprisingly, the resort to these factors has led to a constant wage and benefits increases to keep up with other places to the point where now where the salary premiums and pension packages have ruined public finances, as unionized workers in the public sector compromise over 40 percent of the workforce. 68 See, for discussion of the competitive landscape, Lee E. Ohanian, The Impact of the Employee Free Choice Act on the U.S. Economy, AEI (2010). 69 Fisk & Pulver, at 66.
For union supporters, unfortunately, the debate takes place on myopic terms.
From their point of view, a forced first contract regime is superior to a holdout game that the NLRA invites. In effect, Fisk, Pulver and others argue that there is little risk that savvy and conservative arbitrators will make a mess of first contract arbitration by imposing onerous terms on employers. From the union perspective arbitration is preferable to the current bargaining system. Management, of course, regards the loss of control over vital labor functions as a risk that it cannot run no matter how soothing the assurance of arbitral neutrality and confidence. But unions do not care
whether compulsory arbitration is a positive sum game. The exit rights under the current system are just to valuable to a firm that could otherwise force the firm to make adjustments in its labor practices whose consequences will outlast any twoyear first contract. Nor in assessing the relative risks of holdout problems versus forced contracts, do union supporters ever acknowledge that the best way to avoid both the holdout and the expropriation game simultaneously is to repeal the NLRA in its entirety, thereby removing both risks simultaneously by creating a competitive market.
That possibility does not enter into the discussion. Rather the argument that Fisk and Pulver construct for compulsory arbitration is in the negative. Don't worry about a wholly untested system that is loathed by one side of the transaction. After all, there is no reason to think that the arbitrators that will be appointed will be biased toward one side or another. Arbitration, after all, has been used in a number of contexts including most notably in connection with public employees, as under Fisk and Pulver write as if the social objectives of any arbitration system is achieved by reaching final agreements that avoid holdouts without bankrupting private firms.
Those goals certainly matter, but they are at best stepping stones to a larger question of whether this system of arbitration will improve the overall operation of labor markets. It won't. The price for industrial peace in the public sector has been runaway increases in salaries and public pension programs that today are the major threat to the solvency of states like New York, precisely because the Taylor Act is in place. The same story can be told about California. 72 The clear pressure in the public area is for arbitrators to impose unsustainable burdens on public bodies that cannot resist. It is quite likely that private employers-at least those large enough to put up a struggle-will put up stouter resistance than public employers, given that they face the short-term risk of The unions may well be willing to take these risks because they will suffer only small fraction of the losses if the firm goes insolvent, but will keep all the gains from a lucrative contract. They will have, moreover, strong incentives to enter into cushy deals for the benefit of current employees, promising fiscal relief to the firm in Fisk and Pulver think that (FOA) could salvage compulsory bargaining by allowing each side to submit a wage bid to an arbitral panel that is told to take one or the other, but not split the difference. The most obvious objection to this point is that in professional sports FOA is used only for single year contract extensions under standardized terms. It is never used to negotiate long term contracts. Nor is it used to deal with contracts that have many moving parts simultaneously. Fisk and Pulver think that this is possible with labor contracts, as it is possible to take, for example, the workers wage demands and the employers pension benefit system. 76 The theoretical objection is that if the terms are considered separately, the interactions between them are necessarily ignored. That point is probably two even with two related terms, but it is surely true with the thousands of different issues that have to be resolved in getting a collective bargaining agreement which has to 76 Id. at cover such hot button issues as contracting out work, health care benefits, discipline, seniority and other issues. 
II. The Internal Operations of EFCA
Thus far I have examined in general form the arguments against changes in the rules governing organizational drives, card-checks, and compulsory bargaining.
That critique took place on the assumption that it was possible to design each of these elements in some coherent fashion so that the means chosen would be calibrated to achieve their ends. Real statutory design always adds a second level of implementation problems, which can be quite astute. Let me end with a closer look at the operational particulars of EFCA in all three areas. What the statute sets out is a broad framework. What it lacks is a sense of how to fill in all the critical pieces.
A. Unfair labor practices during negotiations. The portion of EFCA is the least radical because it accepts the traditional framework in which union organizational campaigns precede union elections. But it adds three distinct turns of the screw are most notable. First, this provision grants a priority of enforcement resources to these violations over all other claims of misconduct, including any and all forms of union statutory violations. Second, the provision also trebles the back pay awards that are made to workers in the event of a finding of an employer unfair labor practice. Third, the statute for the first time authorizes fines up to $20,000 per violation-a term that receives no statutory definition-of either the overlapping provisions of section 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3) of the act, dealing with employer coercion against employees or employer discrimination against pro union workers. That per violation fine is only triggered against employers who "willfully or repeatedly" commits these unfair labor practices.
Under this provision, few employers will escape as a matter of law the epithet willful, which in turn gives rise to countless occasions in which the NLRA can find multiple separate employer violations during any recognition campaign. The intense nature of the sanctions virtually guarantees that a NLRB finding of even one violation carries with it the overwhelming probability that it will simultaneously find dozens or perhaps hundreds of other violations, each subject to the maximum fine. EFCA only instructs the Board to "consider the gravity of the unfair labor practice and the impact of the unfair labor practice on the charging party, on other persons seeking to exercise rights guaranteed by this Act, or on the public interest."
That language, which is vague and unformed, has a further defect in that it gives no notice as to the number of violations. But the possibilities are legion. Read literally, it looks as though each violation covers "the charging party." Written in the singular, this expression suggests that a single violation could, and perhaps even must, involve the employer coercion directed against a single worker. From that it follows that if multiple workers were held to be subject to untoward prejudice or antiunion animus, each such offense would generate a distinct violation. In addition, separate attempts by employer representatives to influence each worker on different days, or by different people, could also augment the total independent
violations. Yet EFCA contains no aggregate cap on damages that night control that risk. Nor does EFCA add mitigating circumstances into the mix, or explicitly provide for judicial review of the fines levied, which might, but need not be read in, in order to avoid serious due process objections unless the normal NLRA rule allow challenges to fines that are not supported by "substantial evidence." 79 To may mind this simple reality raises the serious question of whether the want of any appeal outside the board is a the imposition of a fine without due process of law. To be sure, an appeal need not on all occasions be required under Due Process. But in this instance, the case seems to be otherwise, for the Board is an inherently political body which in the Obama administration is now staffed with three democrats and two republicans. Those fixed party loyalties should count as a red flag for the radical increase in sanctions. A judicial appeal allows some body in Nor is there any limitation on the composition of the Board, which need not take the form of one arbitrator chosen by each side, with a third chosen by the other two.
EFCA does not specify any of the procedures that are to be used before the arbitration board, give any criteria by which the arbitration should take place, put any limitation on the time by which the final determination should be made, or even make it clear whether the two period runs from union recognition, the onset of arbitration, or the final resolution. The best guess is that the decision only binds going forward, which leaves open the question of what provisions govern during the interim period. Indeed there is nothing in EFCA that precludes the contract from stating that at the end of the two year period, the parties are bound to extend it another two years. That seems unlikely, but there are evident difficulties in any legal regime that then returns to the usual system of collective bargaining negotiations, which are apt to prove especially tough, as the both the employer and the union can object to using the old agreement as the basis for the renewal, given the coercive nature of its origins.
III. An Economic Overview of EFCA
All these elements were at play in the automobile industry which has bled workers in recent years. The compulsory arbitration on the heels of a card check is likely to produce very pronounced declines in employment levels, which is the last thing that is needed today. Compulsory arbitration will only make unions more potent. As such it will only aggravate, not ameliorate the concerns of the current system. Consider the dynamic consequences. Facing the prospect of instant and costly unionization will dampen the rate of formation of new firms that fear a serious financial hit early on in their life-cycles. It will also retard the expansion of existing firms who fear that a tide of new workers could bring in a unionized regime. Overall, the most adverse consequences are likely to fall on low income, low skill jobs, that the price increases will prove most devastating to total number of employees. 80 The only question is the size of these effects, and the evidence suggests that it is high. Here is some simple data evidence that should not be ignored. Ohanian presents evidence that for each one percent expansion in the level of the unionized workforce, overall employment 80 Ohanian, supra at 22. rates will drop substantially, depending on the fraction of workers unionized, and the market premiums that they can obtain. Thus his data reads as follows: The high estimate of four and one half million jobs does not seem creditable, not because the premium is off, but because the share of union workers seems to high.
Indeed the general consensus is that in those cases where unions take hold they can exert an increase of 15 to 20 percent in real wages over competitive numbers. 81 Those figures, however, are tricky to interpret, because they only address those firms that were able to survive with union representation, not those which fell by the wayside because they could not meet those premiums, or which never formed 
Conclusion: An Economic Menace
EFCA represents a concerted effort by organized labor to regain much of the power that it has lost over the last 50 years. In some real sense this concerted political campaign is quixotic because the liberalization of product markets both at home and abroad reduce the possibility that any union could extract huge settlements from any employer. But that does not mean that EFCA could not cause a great deal of harm along the way. All of its provisions work well together to create a seamless enterprise in which unions can lodge powerful sanctions against an employer that opposes its organization drive, which ends in recognition through card check. That card check can be obtained without the full participation of all workers in discussion, let alone a secret ballot election. Once that union is chosen, it can force a contract through to arbitration, again without consulting the rank and file. Taken as a whole, the workers lose the two major checks that the current law gives them against their union representatives: the election and the contract ratification. The huge change in power allows the union to impose terms of firms that in the best of circumstances impede their operation, reduce their ability to expand, or drive them from the marketplace altogether.
Labor supporters say trust us with this power, we shall now abuse it. But the institutional constraints built into EFCA are so weak that the doomsday scenario is all too likely to occur. Higher rates of unionization mean fewer jobs, and lower levels of production. EFCA turns that screw several notches. None of its overall consequences will work for the benefit of employers or union members, no matter how much power they confer on the union hierarchy. Defenders of labor unions spin out all sorts of clever theories to explain why the world would be a better place with union representation. But the grim truth is that no one profits from legal complexity,
